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posterior distributions accurately. One of the method’s disadvantages is it’s reliance on gradient
evaluations over the full data, which quickly becomes computationally costly when the data sets
grow large. By mini-batching the data set for stochastic gradient approximations we can speed up
the algorithm, albeit with a reduced posterior accuracy. We illustrate by using a toy example, that
the stochastic version of the method is unable to explore the exact posterior, and we show how an
added friction term greatly alleviates this, when the term is adjusted carefully.
We use the added stochastic error to our advantage, by turning the results differentially private.
The randomness in the results masks the appearance of any single data point in the used data
set, creating a way to more secure handling of sensitive data. In the case of stochastic gradient
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo, we are able to achieve reasonable privacy bounds with little to no decrease
in optimization performance, although finding a good the differentially private approximation of
the target posterior becomes harder. In addition, we compare the previously considered privacy
accounting methods to assay the privacy bounds to a new privacy loss distribution method, which
is able to determine a tighter privacy profile than, for example, the moments accountant method.
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1. Introduction
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) techniques [13] are one of the advanced sampling
methods in use today. Originally discovered to model the dynamic molecular inter-
actions in chemistry and physics, the method’s usefulness in extracting information
from probability distributions, such as posterior distributions of Bayesian models, was
discovered shortly after. The energy conserving methods allow for more efficient explo-
ration of the posterior distribution than standard random walk operations, and thus
HMC needs less iterations than the other Markov chain implementations to explore
the target set. However, for every iteration the gradients have to be evaluated over the
whole data set, resulting in inefficient and slow iterations when the data set is large.
To decrease and possibly distribute the computational burden, the gradients can be
stochastically approximated from smaller batches of the original data [12].
Michael Betancourt has argued [7] that the gradients computed from naively sub-
sampled batches cannot accurately simulate Hamiltonian dynamics and thus represent
the posterior distribution. In this thesis we evaluate Betancourt’s observation and
demonstrate its impact on HMC sampling in different situations.
As the popularity of machine learning (ML) rises both in academia and in the
industry, more and more sensitive data is being processed by ML algorithms. Data
breaches are bound to happen and proper precautions should be taken to alleviate the
damage. There are multiple ways to extract unprotected data from these algorithms
and they should be secured accordingly.
Differential privacy (DP) aims to perturb the data or the algorithm outcome in a
way this becomes difficult. The most common way is to perturb the data or algorithm
outcome just so that the accuracy of the model is not compromised, but individual data
points cannot be identified or deduced from the results. For example, we can calculate
one person’s weight from the average weight of a group of people, if the average weight
of rest of the group is known exactly. The accuracy at which the person’s weight can
be computed decreases, when the means of these groups are perturbed according to
DP – either by perturbing the weight data or the mean computations.
The second part of this thesis introduces the theory of differential privacy and
different methods for computing privacy bounds of certain DP algorithms used to
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implement the HMC sampling. Furthermore we compare these algorithms’ privacy
preserving capabilities and show how to compute the privacy guarantees tightly with
newly discovered privacy accounting methods.
We briefly walk through the Markov chain sampling and other preliminaries, and
then move on to Hamiltonian dynamics and show how it is used to approximate prob-
ability distributions in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we combine the stochastic gradient
approximations with the Hamiltonian dynamics for increased computational perfor-
mance. The concept of differential privacy and different ways to obtain and calculate
privacy profiles for algorithms are introduced in Chapters 4 and 5. Finally, in Chapter 6
we implement DP to Hamiltonian methods, following by test results for both standard
and private algorithms.
2. Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
This chapter introduces the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo algorithm and the potentially
more efficient stochastic gradient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (SGHMC) by Chen et al.
[12]. We demonstrate the algorithms’ strengths and weaknesses and walk through
Betancourt’s arguments as to why a mini-batched HMC can not model the posterior
distribution accurately.
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo is a powerful tool to traverse a target set, e.g. a prob-
ability distribution without random-walk like behaviour, which can be also seen as
waste of computing power. It is based on physical model consisting of potential and
kinetic energy, which models the target as a geometrical representation of the potential
energy. One can imagine playing mini-golf on an uneven field. Every time the ball is
hit, it launches into desired direction at different speeds. The ball is prone to sliding
along the curves of the terrain’s topography, unless it is hit hard enough to overcome
them. Regarding Hamiltonian dynamics, the terrain is the target set, and the typical
use-case is to find the lowest point of the terrain.
2.1 Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Markov chain is a way to traverse a typical set stochastically. Commonly it is used to
approximate the posterior distribution of a Bayesian model pi(q|X) ∝ pi(q)ΠNn=1pi(xn|q),
or
pi(q|X) = pi(q) · Π
N
n=1pi(xn|q)∫
ΠNn=1pi(xn|q) · pi(q)dpi
.
In complex models and for large data sets the integral quickly becomes nigh-impossible
or too costly to evaluate. Therefore an accurate approximation of the posterior is
needed to efficiently obtain posterior distributions for large models. Here pi(q) is the
prior distribution of the parameter vector q in a model space Ω and pi(xn|q) is the
likelihood for the nth data point x in the set X of N items.
The typical Markov chain implementation is the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm,
which has two phases: the proposal phase and the correction phase. For a vector of
states q = (q1, . . . , qt), a new sample qt+1 is drawn from a proposal probability density
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Q(q′|q) and the new state vector that includes the new sample is marked as q′. For the
random walk Metropolis, the Gaussian distribution is typically used as the proposal
distribution with covariance matrix Σ:
Q(q′|q) = N (q′|q,Σ).
To ensure that the new sample doesn’t stray too far from the typical set of the target
distribution pi(q|X), each new proposal is accepted as a part of the chain with the
probability
α(q′|q) = min
(
1, Q(q|q
′)pi(q′)
Q(q′|q)pi(q)
)
.
The Gaussian proposal distribution has a natural bias towards larger distribution vol-
umes and the proposals from low-density areas of the model space are rejected. With
enough iterations the chain will converge exactly to the target distribution pi(q|X) [10],
however this rarely is feasible due to finite resources and slowness of the traversal. Es-
pecially in higher dimensions a close-enough approximation from appropriate sample
size is used [8].
The position of the target set is typically unknown, and the chain is started
at a random point. From there it usually takes the algorithm multiple iterations to
converge to the target distribution and to start accepting samples drawn independent
of the previous samples [8, 10]. These preliminary samples are typically discarded
as part of a "burn-in" process to rid the sample collection of correlation. When the
target is located, the initial, crude approximation of the target set is acquired quickly.
Additional drawn samples increase the posterior accuracy, but at the same time the
speed at which the accuracy improves decreases, until any meaningful progress demands
multiple new samples [10].
2.1.1 Volumes in Higher Dimensions
In higher dimensions, the volume and density inside the target set will largely diminish
compared to outside volume of the model space [8] (Fig. (2.1). In other words, the
ratio between empty space and the area of interest grows larger. Due to random walk
MCMC’s bias to higher volumes, the vast majority of new proposals will be drawn
from the outside of the target and rejected. The accepted samples are drawn close
to starting point, leading to very slow exploration of the target distribution. We will
next show that the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo method has capability of following the
target set more efficiently, even in higher dimensions, and taking larger leaps towards
the unexplored areas of the distribution [8].
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Figure 2.1: Increasing the target space dimensionality does not preserve the area/volume ratio of
the target set and its complement. MCMC sampler is predisposed towards high volumes and as such
biases outwards from the target set in higher dimensions. Figure by Michael Betancourt [8].
2.2 Hamiltonian Dynamics
Initially Hamiltonian dynamics were conjured to simulate molecular interactions and
movement trajectories in physics. Later it was discovered that the trajectories of the
molecules could be deterministically simulated by following Newton’s law of momen-
tum [3]. The same principles allow an efficient sampling of almost any probability
distribution, and the modern Hamiltonian Monte Carlo Markov chain method follows
this approach [8].
To mimic the conservation of energies in physical systems, Hamiltonian dynam-
ics introduces a new, independent auxiliary variable p, the momentum, alongside the
proposal sample q, the state or the position. We expand the d-dimensional parameter
space to 2d-dimensional phase space [8]:
q → (q, p). (2.1)
Continuing with the analogy, the energy (i.e. Hamiltonian) of the Hamiltonian
system is marked H(q, p) [13] and can usually be presented by the sum of potential
energy U(q) and kinetic energy K(p, q) as follows:
H(q, p) = K(p, q) + U(q).
For brevity’s sake we utilize the commonly used Euclidean metric to determine our
kinetic energy, which resembles the "real-world" counterpart
Ek =
mv2
2 .
When the kinetic energy is independent of the position and thus the state q, the
Hamiltonian is called separable [7]. For example, the Euclidean metric operates like
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this, and the Hamiltonian can be defined as
H(q, p) = K(p) + U(q).
In Hamiltonian dynamics, the change of q and p over time, t, is determined by H’s
partial derivatives, which define the Hamilton’s differential equations [8, 24]:
dq
dt
= ∂H
∂p
= ∂K
∂p
dp
dt
= −∂H
∂q
= −∂K
∂q
− ∂U
∂q
.
(2.2)
Here Both equations are gradients w.r.t p and q:
∂H
∂p
=

∂H
∂p1...
∂H
∂pn
 and
∂H
∂q
=

∂H
∂q1...
∂H
∂qn
 .
Together with the initial values (q0, p0), the equations (2.2) give the Hamiltonian sys-
tem. The partial derivatives form the Hamiltonian vector field. For separable Hamil-
tonians i.e. ones based on Euclidean metric, the vector field can also be decoupled to
kinetic and potential vector fields:
~H = ∂H
∂p
∂
∂q
− ∂H
∂q
∂
∂p
≡ ~K + ~U.
Next we define the mapping φHt , Hamiltonian flow, which maps the initial values
of q and p to the solution at the moment of time t:
φHt (q, p) = (q(t), p(t)) . (2.3)
The joint canonical density distribution of the two variables q and p is [8]
pi(q, p) = pi(p|q) · pi(q). (2.4)
As we are only interested in the state q, by marginalizing the momentum in the joint
density distribution, we acquire the target distribution. After integrating over the
Hamiltonian for some time t i.e., applying the Hamiltonian flow onto the phase space
(2.1)
(q, p)→ φHt (q, p),
we can project the resulting phase space back to the target space [7] to acquire a new
sample for the Markov chain:
(q(t), p(t))→ q(t).
The density of the canonical distribution does not depend on any choice of parametriza-
tion, and thus can be written in terms of invariant Hamiltonian function [8]
pi(q, p) = e−H(q,p).
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2.2.1 Base Properties of Hamiltonian Systems
One of the base properties of Markov chain is the reversibility of the chain. To keep the
target distribution invariant, there should be a way to compute the previous state from
any state in the chain. Hamiltonian dynamics complies with this requirement: when
K(p, q) = K(−p, q), we can negate the time derivatives in the Hamilton’s equations
and can so obtain the state (q(t), p(t)) from the state (q(t + 1), p(t + 1)) [24], and
backtrack our way through the sampling execution.
The Invariancy of the Hamiltonian System
The joint density pi(q, p) does not depend on the parametrization i.e., the Hamiltonian
dynamics is kept invariant for d-dimensional parameter vectors [8, 24]:
dH
dt
=
d∑
i=1
[
dqi
dt
∂H
∂qi
+ dpi
dt
∂H
∂pi
]
=
d∑
i=1
[
∂H
∂pi
∂H
∂qi
− ∂H
∂qi
∂H
∂pi
]
= 0.
Thus we can set the Hamiltonian to equal the joint density function (2.4)[8]:
H(q, p) = − log pi(q, p)
i.e.,
pi(q, p) = e−H(q,p).
From this follows that we can decompose joint density function as
H(q, p) = − log pi(q, p)
= − log pi(p|q)− log pi(q)
= K(p, q) + U(q)
Alternatively, in the Euclidean metric the kinetic energy can be defined in quadratic
form as
K(p) = p
TM−1p
2
for convenience’s sake [24]. HereM is a symmetric, positive-definite matrix resembling
the mass of the object in the physical analogue. Typically M is a diagonal identity
matrix, and can be used to rotate and rescale the target distribution if necessary [24].
Although, in practice M is seldom used beyond that, and thus we omit it from the
equations for the rest of the thesis, for brevity’s sake.
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Symplecticity
The Hamiltonian system H is symplectic i.e., for the Jacobian matrix A of the exact
flow of the mapping φHt
A = ∂φ
H
t (q, p)
∂(q, p)
holds true
ATJA = J,
where
J =
 0d Id
−Id 0d
 .
Essentially, the properties possessed by the phase space (q, p) will retain these
properties even after being transformed by the Hamiltonian φHt . Especially the volume
of (p, q) is preserved throughout the computation, as
det(AT ) det(J) det(A) = det(J)
which implies that
det(A)2 = 1, (2.5)
since det(J) = 1 and det(A) = det(AT ). From (2.5) follows that det(A) is either 1
or −1, due the mapping φHt being continuous function w.r.t the time variable t, and
initially at t = 0 the mapping is an identity matrix:
φH0 = Id.
Thus, the determinant can not jump from positive to negative [17] and the mapping
φHt is a symplectic mapping.
The Choice of Kinetic Energy and the Energy Conservation
Euclidean metric is the classical choice for the simulation of energies, though a model
employing Riemannian manifolds tends to converge faster and more accurately at the
expense of greatly increased computational complexity per iteration [16, 32]. Given the
need one could craft their own kinetic energy metric to the exact need of their model,
but it would be resource-intensive to find a properly working equation, and the either
of the previous Gaussian-based metrics typically give good performance in almost any
model [8, 24].
The canonical distribution also ensures that likewise in the physical dynamics
model, the conservation of energies are kept intact: the volume of energy consisting
of the 2d-dimensional phase space (q, p) stays constant throughout the process [8, 24].
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Figure 2.2: HMC models the target set as a construct of potential energy. The red line resembles
integrator trajectory traversing the set and the dots are drawn samples from the set. Figure by Alex
Rogozhnikov [27].
When the (q, p) space stretches along either of the variables, e.g. the potential energy
increases, the space will equally shrink along the other, as the kinetic energy decreases
[8]:
dq(t)dp(t) = dq(0)dp(0).
A vector field with zero divergence is known to preserve volume [5], and this property
can be shown with the vector field defined by the Hamilton’s equations [24]:
d∑
i=1
[
∂
∂qi
dqi
dt
+ ∂
∂pi
dpi
dt
]
=
d∑
i=1
[
∂
∂qi
∂H
dpi
− ∂
∂pi
∂H
dqi
]
=
d∑
i=1
[
∂2H
∂qi∂pi
− ∂
2H
∂pi∂qi
]
= 0.
The conservation of energy restricts every Hamiltonian trajectory to an energy
level set (notation due [8])
H−1(E) = {q, p|H(q, p) = E},
that are compact 2d−1-dimensional surfaces in the phase space. Between the trajectory
simulations the momentum p is sampled again and the algorithm transcends from one
energy set to another, as presented in Figure (2.3).
2.3 HMC in Practice
As per the previous sections, the HMC is compatible with Markov chain requirements.
However, as numeric procedures are prone to introduce stacking error to the calcula-
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Figure 2.3: Four integrator steps simulated consecutively. With the re-sampling of the momentum
p, the phase space switches from a energy level to another on the energy level set. After a set length
the phase space (q, p) is projected back to target space. Figure by Michael Betancourt [8].
tions, the trajectories in the Hamiltonian vector field need a special numerical inte-
grator. Even these sophisticated methods introduce a small amount of error, and we
should adjust for that.
2.3.1 Symplectic Integrators and the Leapfrog Method
In practice, the exact Hamiltonian flow trajectories are usually not feasible to calculate
due to non-linearity of the involved differential equations. Also the error induced by
the commonly used numerical integrators will compound and bias these trajectories, so
that they will drift away from the actual trajectories in the Hamiltonian vector field. A
group of integrators, called symplectic integrators, are tailored for Hamiltonian systems
to preserve the symplecticness and so the accuracy of the Hamiltonian transition [8, 24].
The numerical integrator is defined by a one-step mapping
yi+1 = φh(yi).
The integrator is symplectic, if the mapping φh(y) is symplectic, meaning that its
Jacobian is a symplectic matrix:(
∂φh(y)
∂y
)T
J
(
∂φh(y)
∂y
)
= J.
For the Hamiltonian system, established in Section (2.2.1) it stands that the mapping
φHt is indeed a symplectic mapping.
Due to numerical constraints the integration time has to be discretized into small
intervals of length η, commonly known as the step size. The trajectory is constructed
by applying the integrator L times onto the system H.
2.3. HMC in Practice 11
One typically used second-order symplectic integrator is the leapfrog integrator,
where the Hamiltonian flow is split into two parts in terms of potential and kinetic
energy. The first a half-step in time is taken along the potential flow and the momentum
p updated. The state q is updated along the kinetic flow, with the new p. Finally the
second half-step in time is taken and the momentum p updated again, with the new q.
In practice, p and q are updated as below:
p(t+ η/2) = p(t)− (η/2)∂U
∂q
q(t)
q(t+ η) = q(t) + p(t+ η/2)η
p(t+ η) = p(t+ η/2)− (η/2)∂U
∂q
q(t+ η)
(2.6)
The resulting p and q would ideally yield the exact solutions for the mapping φHt , how-
ever a small numerical error is introduced in the time stepping: while the integrator
itself is exact, approximating the continuous time with discrete steps cause deviation
from the actual trajectory. The leapfrog integrator approximately preserves the energy
of the system H(q, p) [8, 24]. This implies small numerical errors in long time integra-
tions [17]. Being symmetric in nature, it also preserves the reversibility requirement
of the Markov chain: by negating p we are able to backtrack the leapfrog steps to the
earlier position [24].
The HMC algorithm is tuned by the step-size of η and the amount of the integrator
steps L. A good starting point for the amount of leapfrog iterations tends to be
L = bT/ηc, where T is the total amount of algorithm iterations t. Smaller step size
leads to more thorough, but slower exploration of the target, and a larger step size
to faster traversal around it. The same stands for the trajectory length L [8]. The
longer trajectories have a high probability of straying farther away from the starting
point than short trajectories, which drastically lowers the autocorrelation between the
samples [7].
2.3.2 Accuracy of Symplectic Integrators
For separable Hamiltonians
H(q, p) = K(p) + U(q),
the subsystems, potential and kinetic energies, are then the exact solutions of the
system
(q, p) =
(
∂K
∂p
, 0
)
(q, p) =
(
−∂H
∂q
, 0
)
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and the method can be presented as a symmetric composition in terms of Strang
splitting [7] i.e., the leapfrog method:
φHη = φUη/2 ◦ φKη ◦ φUη/2
= e
η
2
~U ◦ eη ~K ◦ e η2 ~U ,
where φUη/2 and φKη give the exact flows corresponding to these subsystems, respectively.
By applying the Baker-Campbell-Hausdorff formula [6] on the equation, which will give
the solution for the equation
eXeY = eZ ,
for lie groups [28] X, Y and Z. This composition yields [7]
e
η
2
~U ◦ eη ~K ◦ e η2 ~U
= exp(η2
~U) ◦ exp
(
η ~K + η2
~U + η
2
4
[
~K, ~U
])
+O(η3)
= exp
(
η
2
~U + η ~K + η2
~U + η
2
4
[
~K, ~U
]
+ 12
[
η
2
~U, η ~K + η2
~U + η
2
4
[
~K, ~U
]])
+O(η3)
= exp
(
η ~H + η
2
4
[
~K, ~U
]
+ η
2
4
[
~U, ~K
]
+ η
2
8
[
~U, ~U
])
+O(η3)
= eη ~H +O(η3),
where we denote [
~K, ~U
]
= ~K~U − ~U ~K.
The compounding error from the exact Hamiltonian flow is bound by O(η2), when this
composition is composed with itself L = bT/ηc times. Here T is the total amount of
iterations, or the integration time [7]:
φH˜η,T ≡
(
φUη/2 ◦ φKη ◦ φUη/2
)L
=
(
exp(η ~H) +O(η3)
)L
= exp((Lη) ~H) + (Lη)O(η2)
= exp(T ~H) + TO(η2)
= eT ~H +O(η2).
2.3.3 Implementing the HMC Algorithm
We can run HMC as a implementation of a MCMC algorithm. We propose the state
q as a part of the Markov chain, while the momentum p is discarded.
In the proposal stage we sample p independently of q from a Gaussian distribution
with zero mean, and the variance M from the kinetic energy quadratic form: p ∼
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N (0,M). The independence of p implies that the canonical joint distribution pi(q, p)
stays invariant [24].
After simulating the leapfrog trajectories (or any other reversible symplectic inte-
grator that preserves the volume of the phase space (q, p)) L times, we obtain the new
proposal q′ (see Fig. (2.2)). Due to the residual error left from the symplectic inte-
grators, the samples q′ would bias the resulting Markov chain and cannot be accepted
outright: the MCMC-like acceptance step is still crucial for an accurate approximation
[7, 9]. The new state is accepted with a probability:
α(q, p) = min
(
1, exp
(
H(q, p)−H ◦ φH˜η,T (q, p)
))
= min (1, exp (H(q, p)−H(q′, p′))) .
Here (q, p) is the initial state and (q′, p′) the new proposed state. In case the proposal is
rejected, a new proposal is solved from the initial state again. However, the probability
for an accepted proposal tends to still be high, as the injected noise is quite small.
Thus, an optimal acceptance rate is around 65-80% [8, 24], whereas for random walk
MCMC the asymptotically optimal ratio should be nearing 23% [26]. For efficiency’s
sake, typically the acceptance range of 23-50% is deemed acceptable [11, 24, 26], as the
complexity of the model will also affect the acceptance ratio – in some cases too low
acceptance might leave some areas of the target distribution unexplored [11, 26].
After the leapfrog integrations the momentum p should be reversed to make the
HMC Markov chain symmetrical. In practice though, is usually is not relevant, as
we can show that K(p) = K(−p), the momentum is rarely needed afterwards, and
it is re-sampled in the next iteration cycle before it is utilised again [24]. The long
deterministic trajectories eliminate the random-walk behaviour and the samples are
less correlated with each other. This means the algorithm finds the target set faster
and we can manage with smaller amount of samples discarded by the burn-in process.
The step size η does not need to be constant throughout the run [24]. As we
later see, there is some benefit for decreasing step size: after converging to the typical
set, long trajectories with the length ηL deviate from the actual vector field H more
and cause lower acceptance rates [24]. Slight variations in the step size enhances the
convergence properties of the algorithm, and it is good practise to perturb η for a small
amount at the start of a new trajectory [24]. With variable step size the phase space
(q, p) cannot be evaluated at consistent time points any more, but this will not affect
the performance of the algorithm or is typically needed for evaluation [24].
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2.3.4 Strengths and Weak Spots of HMC Method
One of the bigger advantages of the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo is its divergence from
random walk behaviour. Long trajectories following the Hamiltonian vector field tra-
verse the target set usually much faster, and with a higher acceptance rate leading to
few wasted computing cycles. The burn-in phase can also be reduced, as the distances
between consecutive samples are typically larger and the trajectories are aimed at the
target set [8][24]. It is shown that HMC is better equipped sampling from a set of
correlated distributions, over many other Markov chain implementations [24].
However, the improved performance comes at the cost: the gradients for the
trajectories must be calculated at every step of the numerical integration. Typically
the performance is still better than with random walk MCMC due to faster convergence
rates – only a fraction of iterations are needed for the same accuracy. As the model
complexity grows and the gradients get slower to evaluate, likewise the step size for
random walk MCMC has to be set low due to its tendency to aim for the higher volumes
[8] (see Section (2.1.1)).
In general, MCMC algorithms have problems traversing areas of high curvature,
e.g. sharp corners in the target set. The pathology stands true to HMC, but fortunately
also for the symplectic integrators. At these points the integrators fail catastrophically
and diverge greatly from the actual Hamiltonian trajectories – by following the sim-
ulated trajectories the problematic areas can be identified and the algorithm tuned
accordingly. Mild pathologies can be remedied by lowering the step size η, though
major problems usually require adjusting or rethinking the prior, or even the target
distribution to avoid biases in the resulting estimate [8].
As with all gradient-dependent algorithms, multi-modal distributions cause prob-
lems, when the algorithm sets to converge into one of the modes. When the sampler
dives into an isolated local minimum, it might not have enough momentum to cross
the energy ridge and leave rest of the target set unexplored. Proper tempering of the
algorithm will alleviate the problem to the extent [24].
3. Stochastic Gradient Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo is a powerful sampling tool, however the gradients must
be computed in each iteration cycle. When the model complexity increases, or the
amount of data increases, the calculations take higher and higher toll on the computer.
When implementing HMC next to a data stream, the whole data set cannot be utilized
outright. With the advent of Big Data, the possible dataset grow impossibly huge and
cannot be evaluated efficiently at once.
In this chapter we show the stochastic gradient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
(SGHMC) algorithm. By dividing the data into smaller batches and applying stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) on them, we can lighten the computational load per iteration.
The basic idea of mini-batch approximation of gradients is given in Section (3.1). To
counteract the error resulting from the stochastic gradients, an additional friction term
can be added to the symplectic integrator, so that the trajectories would follow the
Hamiltonian flow more closely [12]. The idea of the friction term is introduced in
Section (3.1.1).
3.1 Implementing the SGHMC Algorithm
For the mini-batch operations we assume that all data X of size N is independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and as such adhering to central limit theorem [7, 12].
In Bayesian statistics, the posterior distribution is presented as a product of likelihoods
for each data point xi ∈ X:
pi(q|X) ∝ pi(q)
N∏
i=1
pi(xi|q).
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Thus the potential energy can also be decomposed into a sum. We can represent the
potential energy as
U(q) = − log (pi(X|q)pi(q)) = − log pi(X|q)− log pi(q)
= −
N∑
n=1
log pi(xn|q)− log pi(q).
The data is divided into batches of size m randomly and uniformly [12], so there will
be N/m sub-sets of data. The full potential energy can then be approximated as
U˜(q) = −N
m
m∑
i=1
log pi(xi|q)− log pi(q)
= −N
m
Uj(q),
where Uj(q) is the potential energy of one mini-batch. We denote the formed mini-
batches with Bj, where j ∈ J = {1, . . . , N/m} is the index of a mini-batch. The
stochastic gradient for ∂U/∂q is calculated as
∇U(q) = −∑
x∈X
∇ log pi(x|q)−∇ log pi(q),
and similarly the total gradient approximated from one mini-batch will be [12]
∇U˜(q) = −N
m
∑
x∈Bj
∇ log pi(x|q)−∇ log pi(q).
Due to the assumption that the data complies with the central limit theorem, this
noisy gradient can be approximated [12] as
∇U˜(q) ≈ ∑
x∈Bj
∇ log pi(x|q)−∇ log pi(q) +N (0, cov(q)) .
Compared to actual gradient, the stochastic gradient injects the error of
N (0, η · cov(q)) to the results. Here cov(q) is the covariance of the parameter vec-
tor q [12]. Naturally, a large batch size B gives more accurate results than smaller
batches.
During the symplectic integration phase, the error enables the entropy to rise
inside the Hamiltonian system H. The canonical joint distribution pi(q, p) is no longer
invariant, as the volume of the system’s energy is supposed to be preserved inside the
system. The resulting estimate distribution biases towards uniform distribution, which
could be far from the actual target distribution [12]. The longer the simulated trajec-
tories are, the more the trajectories differ from the actuals and entropy is increased.
Because of the bias, the proposals have to be validated, and we again have a need
for Metropolis-Hastings acceptance step. The acceptance is computed over the whole
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data set, which makes it a computationally heavy operation and thus we prefer not to
run it after only short trajectory simulations. On the other hand, longer simulations
get more biased, are likely to be rejected and we again lose the potential computational
gains as more iterations are needed for convergence [12].
3.1.1 Friction Term
To counteract the bias from the stochastic noise, Chen et. al [12] propose adding a
friction term to the integration. Properly tuned, it negates the error and also retains
the joint distribution pi(q, p) as an invariant. In a real-world analogue, the friction
between a rolling ball and the surface will keep the ball on track and more resistant to
winds that would otherwise change its course. The friction decreases the total energy of
the HamiltonianH(q, p): as the entropy is shown to strictly increase [12], the additional
energy loss will balance the system’s energy by stalling the ratio at which the energy
increases.
The friction term implemented into the system could be seen as a partial momen-
tum update, and it originates from second-order Langevin dynamics [12]. It does not
improve the standard HMC method with noiseless gradients, however it is crucial in
counteracting the injected noise in stochastic gradients. With Hamiltonian system H ′,
augmented with an appropriately selected friction term, the dynamics give the unique
stationary distribution
pi(q, p) ∝ e−H(q,p).
(Theorem 3.2 [12]).
We introduce the friction term BM−1p to the trajectory calculations, such that
the updates for the momentum p are changed:
p(t) = p(t− t′)− η2
(
∂U
∂q
(q(t− t′))− Bp(t− t′) + ξ
)
, ξ ∼ N (0, 2B).
Here B = (η/2) · cov(q) is the diffusion matrix contributed by the gradient noise, called
the noise model. The states (t− t′) refer to the previous state of the parameters p and
q, whether they were the state of the first or the second half-step in the integrator (2.6)
[12].
In practice the exact B is typically not known, and we have to use an approximate
B˜. We introduce a user-specified model C  B to have more control over the noise
reduction [12]. Here A  B denotes that A − B ≥ 0 i.e., A − B is a positive semi-
definite matrix. A  B indicates similarly that A − B > 0 and is a positive definite
matrix.
The stochastic noise B will eventually reach zero, as η → 0, and so the substitute
C and the injected noise will dominate over B and the stochastic error, when we use a
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strictly decreasing sequence of step sizes [12, 33]. The integration step (2.6) is updated
with the new equation for the momentum updates as follows:
p(t) = p(t− t′)− η2
(
∂U
∂q
(q(t− t′))− CM−1p(t− t′) + ξ + ξ′
)
≡ p(t− t′)− η2
(
∂U
∂q
(q(t− t′))− Cp(t− t′) + ξ
)
,
(3.1)
where ξ ∼ N
(
0, 2(C − B˜)
)
and ξ′ ∼ N (0, 2B) . As C  B, likewise ξ  ξ′ and ξ
dominates over other Gaussian errors. To omit the MH-acceptance step, the SGHMC
algorithm uses a strictly decreasing series of step sizes η, which satisfy the Robbins-
Monro conditions [25, 33]
∑
i
η2i <∞ and
∑
i
ηi =∞, ηi ∈ η.
The same step-size decay is implemented in stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics
(SGLD) [12, 33]. These conditions make sure that the parameter vector q eventually
reaches the high probability regions of the target set and that the model will converge
to the mode [33]. We typically can tolerate a small error, so the step size is bounded by
a small non-zero value instead of dropping down to zero. The trade-off is between the
efficiency of the algorithm and the accuracy: when η → 0, the algorithm is sampling
the exact posterior and the error becomes a non-issue, but the trajectories also become
increasingly short – many more iterations are needed to wholly traverse the target
distribution [12, 33].
Additionally, if B˜ = B, then the integrator (3.1) results in stationary distribution
pi(q, p) ∝ e−H(q,p), as the momentum update would simplify to
p(t) = p(t− t′)− η2
(
∂U
∂q
(q(t− t′))− Cp(t− t′) + ξ
)
, ξ ∼ N (0, 2C) . (3.2)
However, this would be incredibly unlikely in practice [12].
Our approximation of the error model B can be either a scalar value or a diagonal
matrix, and the user-defined model C can very well be arbitrary, as long as the equation
C  B is satisfied. Chen et al. suggest [12] that B˜ can be approximated as zero and C
as a small scalar value without affecting the outcome of the algorithm. Typically, the
step sizes are decreased polynomially
ηt = a(b+ t)−γ,
where γ ∈ [0.5, 1] and t is the current iteration. Values a and b are used to scale the
steps between desired values [33].
3.2. The Implications of Naive Sub-sampling 19
Approximating the Error B
In case we need an accurate representation of the estimated error B˜, we can approximate
it via the diffusion matrix B˜ = 12ηV (q), where V (q) is the empirical Fisher information
i.e., the covariance of the gradients w.r.t. parameter θ [2]
V (θ|Bj) = 1
m− 1
m∑
i=1
(
gi(θ)− g¯m(θ)
)(
gi(θ)− g¯m(θ)
)T
.
Here Bj is the jth mini batch of m data points {x1, . . . , xm}, g(θ) is the score i.e., the
gradient of the log likelihood w.r.t data-point xi:
gi(θ) = gi(θ|xi ∈ Bj) = ∇θ log pi(θ|xi)
and g¯(θ) = 1
m
∑m
i=1 g(θ) is the score average.
If it happens that B˜ = B and the eq. (3.2) stands, the initially non-zero error
B = 12ηV → 0 as η → 0, and our estimation B˜ = 0 is still valid. Thus this bears little
significance in our use case. We choose to omit the error approximation for the rest of
the thesis, as it adds another parameters to consider for differential privacy calculations
in the next chapters, without a significant advantage in the model precision.
3.2 The Implications of Naive Sub-sampling
In addition to the entropy increasing bias found by Chen et al. [12], Michael Betan-
court argues [7] that the naively sub-sampled data sets will almost always introduce
irreducible error to the estimate target distribution. Only when the data is redun-
dant or tall i.e., either the data points overlap or there are only few dimensions per
data point and the data points are more numerous than the data dimensions, may the
sub-sampling yield acceptable results.
We assume again that the data is i.i.d. and that the total potential energy is the
sum of all potential energies of the mini-batches
U(q) =
∑
j∈J
Uj(q),
where J denotes the index of the N/m mini-batches. The full potential energy can
then be approximated with the help of one mini-batch [7] as
U˜(q) ≈ |J |Uj(q).
As we are now using only a fraction of the original data to calculate the potential
energy, the symplectic integrators are compromised with a bias that interferes with
the energy-preserving property of Hamiltonian dynamics. Two different approaches
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are possible – either the data is sub-sampled between the simulated trajectories or
repeatedly for every time-step inside the trajectory. In the spirit of not utilizing the
data-set as whole, the MH-acceptance step is omitted for both methods [7].
Figure 3.1: The error in the trajectory simulations exemplified. Without the exact gradients or
corrective manoeuvres the trajectory of the sample (the satellite) strays from the actual Hamiltonian
vector and biases the outcome, in this case striking the satellite out of the orbit. Figure by Michael
Betancourt [7].
3.2.1 Data Sub-sampling Between the Trajectories
When the total potential energy is approximated with sub-sampled Uj(q), the approx-
imate Hamiltonian is likewise Hj = K(p) + |J |Uj(q) [7]. This leads to an similar
proportioned error on the every step of the integration process:
e
η
2
~Uj ◦ eη ~K ◦ e η2 ~Uj = eη ~Hj +O(η3)
= eη ~Hj−η
−−→
∆V j +O(η3).
Here
−−→∆U j = (~U − |J |~Uj) = −
(
∂U
∂q
− |J |∂Uj
∂q
)
∂
∂p
.
When the composition is again composed with itself L times, the error over the whole
trajectory is of second order. The constant in front of the O(η) term depends only on
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T = ηL:
φ
H˜j
η,T ≡
(
φ
Uj
η/2 ◦ φKη ◦ φUjη/2
)L
= eT ~Hj +O(η2)
= eT ( ~H−
−−→
∆Uj) +O(η2).
As the target dimensions grow, the more the gradient approximation parts from the
true gradient. This will result in either diminishing acceptance ratio for the potential
acceptance step or biased estimates [7]. Highly redundant data might alleviate the bias,
because the sample could then contain more of the original meaningful information,
but this is not a realistic assumption for many cases.
The Biased trajectories compromise the preservation of the volume in the phase-
space (q, p), leading to malformed estimated target level set (see Fig. (3.1) for example).
As opposed to error resulting from the symplectic integrators itself, the error from the
approximate gradient is invariant to the step-size η [7] and thus cannot be fixed by
denser time discretization.
The difference between true and stochastic gradient rise as the sample size B de-
creases, meaning higher batch sizes yield more accurate results. Betancourt concludes,
that only batch sizes B = N/2 and up may give us acceptable results [7]. Here N is
the total amount of data-points.
3.2.2 Data Sub-sampling During a Trajectory
The second approach is to sample the original data set L times during the trajectory
calculations, one batch per iteration. We hope that the biases from different samples
cancel each other out as the trajectory is computed, as is done during the SGHMC
algorithm [12], before adding the friction term.
Similarly to the previous case, where one batch was used per trajectory, the
simulated trajectories are biased by the errors [7]
B1 = − 1
L
L∑
l=1
−−→∆U jl
= ~U − |J |
L
L∑
l=1
~Ujl
= −
(
∂U
∂q
− |J |
L
L∑
l=1
∂Uj
∂q
)
∂
∂p
and
B2 = η
([
~H,
−−→∆U jl
]
−
[
~H,
−−→∆U jL
])
.
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While B2 can be alleviated by having the last iteration of the trajectory simulation use
the same batch of data as the first iteration, jL = j1 [7], the error B1, that is due the
energy difference between the actual gradient and the stochastic gradient, is harder to
deal with. To completely erase the error, the average gradient of the used batches must
yield the gradient of the full potential energy. Using all the sampled batches exactly
twice during the trajectory will eradicate both errors B1 and B2, but we lose all the
computational efficiency we are after by using stochastic gradients [7].
4. Differential Privacy
In this chapter we introduce the concept of differential privacy (DP) and means to
find privacy bound for differentially private algorithms, focusing on the new method
for computing the privacy guarantees tightly by Koskela et al. [19]. We also show that
only minor modifications are necessary for SGHMC-algorithms to achieve differentially
private sampling results.
When processing for example medical information of a group of patients in a
hospital, or other similarly intimate or classified information, we do not want the
adversaries to obtain the exact results. Even if the obtained data set cannot alone
be used to identify people, today there are countless otherwise innocuous data sets
available to public, and situationally these sets could be combined to infer identifying
information with high probability.
Netflix published a large, anonymized data set of movie ratings to the public,
for a competition with a goal to improve movie recommendation engine. The data set
alone was free of outright identifying information, but by comparing the ratings and
their timestamps to Internet Movie Database’s (IMDB) user-given ratings, researchers
were able to uniquely identify 99% of the 500, 000 users whose rating information was
published. Further, the review and the movie watching history of the individual can be
analysed to deduce more private informations, like political or religious beliefs [23]. Of
course false-positives are bound to happen with such a limited auxiliary information,
though the sheer size of the privacy break make a large part of these users prone to
data breaches.
Users might use the same alias for multiple services, or in the worst case use their
own name online. A single positive identifier could open the flood gates to considerable
security breach, as the modern computers have the capability and resources to gather
information from multiple giant data sets. Large companies such as Apple have started
to adopt differential privacy in some of their systems [4], to protect the user data they
gather from device analytics. This DP data is then used e.g. for better text and emoji
prediction algorithms without compromising single users preferences.
In this chapter we define the concept of differential privacy, and introduce the
common methods guaranteeing, that an output of a model does not compromise the
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privacy of the used data.
4.1 The Definition of Differential Privacy
The (, δ)-differential privacy ((, δ)-DP) is defined with the help of remove/add neigh-
bouring relation [19, 30]. We say that the data sets X, Y ∈ X n are neighbours (denoted
by X 'R Y ) when Y is obtained from X by removing or adding a data point. For
example, otherwise identical matrices X and Y would differ by one additional row.
These data sets are then called adjacent. For the substitution relation, see [19, 30].
The differential privacy is measured in variables  and δ.  denotes the acceptable
privacy loss or privacy budget – the probability of results drawn from adjacent sets X
and Y differing greatly. We are also allowed to slightly diverge from this requirement,
by exceeding the budget with the probability δ [14, 15, 31].
Mathematically, differential privacy is defined as follows [15, 31]: a randomized
algorithm A, also called the privacy mechanism, is (, δ)-differentially private within
the domain X n, if for all measurable sets S ⊂ Range(A) and for all X, Y ∈ X n such
that X 'R Y , we have
P(A(X) ∈ S) ≤ exp()P(A(Y ) ∈ S) + δ. (4.1)
The intuition here is that as long as the parameters  and δ are small enough,
the two datasets should output close to same results, even if one data point does not
exist in one of them, i.e., the end result does not depend on any single data point. The
potential attackers cannot recognize which data set was used to obtain the results, and
the outcome is then much less useful for trying to infer any information about any one
data point, or even the existence of the point altogether. When we set δ = 0, we do
not allow any variation exceeding our privacy budget and hence have stronger privacy
guarantees, and we call the algorithm ()-differentially private.
The definition is also robust against post-processing, and a composition of DP-
algorithms preserves the DP-property [15]:
• If A is an (, δ)-DP algorithm, then for all algorithms A′, the composition (A′◦A)
is also (, δ)-DP algorithm [31].
• If A′ is (′, δ′)-DP, then the composition (A′ ◦ A) is (+ ′, δ + δ′)-DP algorithm
[31].
This guarantees that the privacy protection cannot be circumvented or reversed by
another algorithm. Also no auxiliary information available to the attacker affects the
privacy guarantees. While the resulting (, δ)-DP is always the sum of associated
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privacy parameters, this allows us to access sensitive data multiple times without losing
all the privacy.
When the neighbouring datasets X and Y differ by size, i.e., one of the sets has
more data points than the other, we call the achieved differential privacy unbounded.
When the datasets are equal in size, but one or more data points have been modified
between them, we achieve bounded differential privacy. Although most of the theory
is interchangeable between the two, potentially achievable privacy bounds differ by a
small margin. In this thesis we concentrate on the unbounded privacy bounds and the
details on the bounded differential privacy can be found in [30].
One common strategy to achieve differential privacy is to inject the results with a
controlled amount of noise, usually Laplace or Gaussian in nature [15, 31]. Increasing
the amount of noise will give us more secure results, but the output accuracy will
inevitably suffer. Thus finding the smallest amount of noise to achieve the given (, δ)-
bounds is important. We will notice, that this is a surprisingly compatible method
achieving privacy for sub-sampled HMC algorithms.
4.2 Gaussian Mechanism
The simplest way to ensure differential privacy of the model output is to add random
noise to the results. To adjust the noise injected to the model, it is calibrated to its
`2-sensitivity. for an arbitrary d-dimensional function f : X n → Rd, the sensitivity is
defined as [1, 31]
∆2f = sup
X'RY
||f(X)− f(Y )||2,
To achieve (, δ)-DP for the function f , we define the Gaussian Mechanism output
of that function as
f˜(X) = f(X) +N (0, σ2).
When we select the standard deviation σ such that
σ ≥ ∆2f
√
2 log(1.25/δ)

,
the output f˜(X) is (, δ)-differentially private [15, 31]. While fast and straight-forward
to implement, with this approach we use all the available privacy budget at once, after
the algorithm has finished the execution. We can reduce the amount of injected noise
and thus increase the accuracy of the algorithm by taking into account the actual
privacy loss iteration by iteration [1, 19]. Moreover, the privacy loss can be reduced by
using sub-sampling of the data [30, 34] at each iteration. This also corresponds to the
mechanism of the DP-SGD algorithm.
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4.3 Moments Accountant Method
For the moments accountant (MA) method, we implement an "accountant" procedure
to the computations. The accountant calculates the privacy cost at every access of
the data set and accumulates them up to the privacy budget, allowing us to find
tighter privacy bounds for given  and δ [1]. The composability properties of (, δ)-DP
functions enables us to add this new procedure without compromising the privacy.
The privacy loss for the output o of an (, δ)-DP algorithm A, adjacent data sets
X and Y and arbitrary auxiliary input aux, that does not depend on the data, is
defined as
L(o|A,aux, X, Y ) , log P(A(aux, X) = o)
P(A(aux, Y ) = o) ,
or more concisely,
LX/Y (t) = log fX(t)
fY (t)
, (4.2)
where the functions fX and fY are probability density functions of the algorithm A for
the datasets X and Y , respectively, at any point t ∈ R [1, 19]. Though various kinds
of algorithms can be differentially private, for simplicity’s sake in this thesis we only
consider algorithms, that have d-dimensional real-valued output, vector A : X n → Rd.
The differentially private SGD implemented for mechanisms in Rd can be analyzed
using one-dimensional density functions [1, 19].
Moments accountant method utilizes the advanced composition lemma [1, 15]:
for all , δ, δ′ ≥ 0, the class of (, δ)-DP algorithms satisfy (′, kδ + δ′)-DP under k-fold
adaptive composition for
′ =
√
2k log(1/δ′)+ k(e − 1).
The lemma allows us to sacrifice some amount of δ for considerable improvement in
the privacy budget  [15, 31]. For a slightly higher δ, we net a smaller .
The moments accountant is itself defined as follows: for a randomized algorithm
A, two adjacent data sets X and Y and the auxiliary input aux, that is independent
of the data sets, the moments accountant with an integer parameter λ is
αA(λ) , maxaux,d,d′ αA(λ|aux, X, Y ),
where the function
αA(λ|aux, X, Y ) , logE (exp(λL(A,aux, X, Y )))
is the logarithm of the function at λ, which generates the moment i.e., the λth moment
of the privacy loss variable [1, 21]. The moments are composable: for an algorithm
A = A1 ◦ A2 ◦ . . .Ak
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and any integer λ stands
αA(λ) =
k∑
i=1
αAi(λ).
Here we consider all previous outputs of moments αAj , j < i, as auxiliary input for the
moment αAi [1, 21].
For any  > 0, the algorithm A is (, δ)-DP for [1, 21]
δ = min
λ
exp(αA(λ)− λ).
With these properties, we can calculate the privacy bounds. Let f be a function
f : X n → Rd such that ||f(·)||2 ≤ 1. Let σ ≥ 1, and B the size of a mini-batch with
sampling probability q = B/N . If q < 1/(16σ), for any integer-valued λ such that
0 < λ ≤ σ2 log(1/(qσ)),
the algorithm
A(X) = ∑
i∈B
f(xi) +N (0, σ2) (4.3)
satisfies [1, 21]
αA(λ) ≤ q
2λ(λ+ 1)
(1− q)σ2 +O(q
3).
Abadi et al. [1] have created an algorithm to calculate the privacy bound for  and δ
according to λ.
All in all, the moments accountant method gives the (, δ)-differential privacy
of the mechanism (4.3) after T iterations. The theoretical results of [1] show that
overall the algorithm A achieves O
(
q
√
T , δ
)
-differential privacy [1]. As the totalling
differential privacy is dependent on many hyper-parameters including the model batch
size and iteration time, tuning the algorithm for maximum privacy can be difficult [1].
4.4 Computing the Privacy Profiles Tightly via Pri-
vacy Loss Distribution
To compute tight values for privacy parameters  and δ, we re-define the differential
privacy (4.1). Along with the privacy loss (4.2) we define the privacy loss distribution
(PLD) of the randomized algorithm A(X) over A(Y ), X 'R Y as ω : Ω→ R [19]:
ω(S) =
∫
{t∈R|LX/Y (t)∈S} fX(t)dt,
where ω is a set of all measurable subsets of R and S ∈ Ω. fX and fY are the probability
density functions of the algorithms A : X n → R for the sets X and Y , respectively.
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When LX/Y is a continuously differentiable and bijective function, for a measurable set
S ⊂ R it holds that [19]
ω(S) =
∫
S
dω
dy
dy, (4.4)
where
dω
dy
=

fX
(
L−1X/Y (y)
) dL−1X/Y (y)
dy
, if y ∈ LX/Y (R)
0, otherwise.
This is proven by selecting t = L−1X/Y (y) [19]:
ω(S) =
∫
{t∈R|LX/Y (t)∈S}
fX(t)dt
=
∫
S∩LX/Y (R)
fX
(
L−1X/Y (y)
) dL−1X/Y (y)
dy
dy.
For one-dimensional distributions, the randomised algorithm A satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy, when∫
S
fX(t)dt ≤ e
∫
S
fY (t)dt+ δ and
∫
S
fY (t)dt ≤ e
∫
S
fX(t)dt+ δ,
for all sets S ⊂ R and for all adjacent data sets X and Y [19]. The algorithm A is
called tightly (, δ)-DP, when no δ′ satisfies δ′ < δ such that A satisfies (, δ′)-DP [19].
For tightly (, δ)-DP algorithm, the parameter δ is computed as [19]
δ = max
X'Y
{∫
R
max{fX(t)− efY (t), 0}dt,
∫
R
max{fY (t)− efX(t), 0}dt
}
. (4.5)
The previous equation (4.5) can be represented by integrals:
δ = max
X'Y
max
{
δX/Y , δY/X
}
,
where
δX/Y =
∫
LX/Y (R)∩[,∞[
(1− e−y)fX
(
L−1X/Y (y)
) dL−1X/Y (y)
dy
dy
and
δY/X =
∫
LY/X(R)∩[,∞[
(1− e−y)fY
(
L−1Y/X(y)
) dL−1Y/X(y)
dy
dy.
With these equations, we represent the parameter δ for one-dimensional, contin-
uous output of a tightly (, δ)-DP algorithm A as
δ = max
X'Y
max
{
δX/Y , δY/X
}
, (4.6)
where
δX/Y =
∫ ∞

(1− e−y)dωX/Y
dy
dy and δY/X =
∫ ∞

(1− e−y)dωY/X
dy
dy.
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The distribution functions dωX/Y
dy
and dωY/X
dy
are defined similarly as in (4.4) [19]. To
utilize this representation for a composition of algorithms, we also need to evaluate the
privacy loss distribution for that composition.
Let A,A′ : X n → R be independent random algorithms that output one-
dimensional random variables with continuous densities. The privacy loss density
function of the composition of A and A′ (be it either A ◦ A′ or A′ ◦ A) is defined
dωcX/Y
du
(y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dωX/Y
dy
(t)dωX
′/Y ′
dy
(y − t)dt. (4.7)
Here the derivative dωX′/Y ′/dy stems from the algorithm A′ [19]. The proof for the
above equations can be found in [19].
With the help of the definitions (4.6) and (4.7), we obtain an integral representa-
tion for δ() [19]. For k consecutive applications of an algorithm A and for some  > 0,
the composition of the algorithms is tightly (, δ)-DP for δ given by the function
δ = max
X'Y
max
{
δX/Y , δY/X
}
,
where
δX/Y =
∫ ∞

(1− e−y)
(
dωX/Y
dy
∗k dωX/Y
dy
)
(y)dy. (4.8)
Here (dωX/Y /dy) ∗k (dωX/Y /dy))(y) is shorthand for the privacy loss density function,
which is the result of compositing the algorithm A with itself k times [19].
This results enables us to numerically compute a tight bound of δ for an algorithm
with appropriately pre-set , or vice-versa. This technique is shown to give tighter
privacy bounds than both moments accountant and Rényi accountant methods [19].
The inverse of (4.8), i.e., the function (δ), can be solved e.g. by Newton’s method
by solving for δ˜ such that |δ(l) − δ˜| ≤ tol, for Newton’s iteration step l and pre-set
tolerance value tol [19]. We skip the details of the numerical method to evaluate (4.8)
and refer to [19] for more details.

5. Implementing the Differential
Privacy to HMC
The sub-sampled HMC methods all add some amount of stochastic error to the al-
gorithm. Incidentally, we can use this inherent noise in order to achieve differential
privacy for our model, leaving us only small adjustments to make [21, 31]. Mainly we
focus on the correct step size sequencing such that we minimize the stochastic noise
per iteration, while still having large enough error to mask our results. To bound the
effect of single data points on the Hamiltonian trajectories, we norm-clip the gradients
using a constant L:
∇U˜ = ∇U
max
(
1, ||∇U ||2
L
) . (5.1)
This operation does not impact the convergence rates of the algorithms, as in practice
its effect is similar to using adaptive step size [21, 29]. Furthermore, the ideal step-size
sequence η would be scaled by L too [21]. If a too small value for L is used, the added
error will dominate the actual gradients and we are unable to achieve good results [29].
The gradient-clipping operation both satisfies the Lipschitz condition and ensures that
the computed gradients satisfy the Lipschitz condition
|∇U˜(x)−∇U˜(x′)| ≤ L|x− x′| ∀x, x′ ∈ X
for the constant L [21]. The constant L is bound to the models log-likelihood pi(xi|q)
and is typically small for continuous distributions, which do not increase or decrease
at exponential rate at any point [31].
Due to usage of adaptive step sizes and restricted maximum iteration time, which
is one parameter for the privacy parameter computations [1], it is good practice to
search for the good starting point for the algorithm. If the location of the target set
is unknown, we would waste the iterations by converging to the set and then not have
enough time to explore the target set adequately. One proposed method for finding the
starting point near the target set is differentially private one posterior sample method
[31], where only one (, δ)-DP sample is used from the sampler.
31
32 Chapter 5. Implementing the Differential Privacy to HMC
In the next sections we adjust the stochastic gradient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
to be compliant with (, δ)-differential privacy requirements.
5.1 Naive Privacy Analysis with the Gaussian
Mechanism
During the HMC algorithm, we only access the source data for the gradient calculations
[24]. The SGHMC is very similar to stochastic gradient descent with momentum and
stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics -algorithms: we are able to achieve DP with
the same technique [31].
As we sample the dataset one sub-set at the time and without the MH acceptance
step, we are bound to inject some stochastic error to the algorithm, which is partially
dependent on the step sizes ηt at any iteration t. By scaling the decreasing step
sizes η appropriately, we mask the results with this noise while still preserving the
computational accuracy. While the privacy mechanism doesn’t demand it, we still must
reduce the step size to zero to ensure accurate sampling from the posterior distribution
[12, 31].
The one of requirements for the functional SGHMC algorithm is the injected
error model C, which should dominate the estimate of the actual error model B˜. The
error C is set such that, along with the step sizes η, it will also dominate the Gaussian
mechanism error at every iteration, which would otherwise be added to the algorithm
[31]. As suggested by Wang et al. [31] we achieve (, δ)-DP:
2(C − B˜)ηt  128NTL
2
B2
log
(2.5NT
Bδ
)
log
(2
δ
)
η2t
⇔2(C − B˜)
ηt
 128NTL
2
B2
log
(2.5NT
Bδ
)
log
(2
δ
)
for all ηt ∈ η,
(5.2)
where L is the Lipschitz constant and B the size of the mini-batch. This holds true,
when ηt → 0 [31]. Then, the injected noise from the error models B˜ and C will dominate
the stochastic error accordingly.
It is essential for the accuracy of the algorithm that the step sizes reach zero.
This leads to unpractically low bounds for the step size and usually we have to tolerate
some amount of residual error and set ηt = max(ηt, ηmin), for some floor value ηmin
[31].
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5.2 Moments Accountant
To achieve (, δ)-DP for SGHMC, we only have to switch to a sequence of the step sizes
η instead of a constant step size. It is shown that the step size sequence of ηt = O(t−α)
yields the optimal values ηt regarding the mean square error bound [21].
If we select the decrease rate for η to be of O(t−1/3), there exists two positive
constants c1 and c2. Assume the sampling probability q = m/N , Lipschitz constant
L and the number of total iterations T . SGHMC algorithm achieves (, δ)-DP for any
 < c1q
2T 2/3, when the step size at iteration t satisfies [21]:
1. ηt ≤ N
L2
2. ηt >
q2N
256L2
3. ηt <
2Nt−1/3
c22L
2T 2/3 log(1/δ)
The first condition is satisfied in practice, as typically N/L2  ηt, especially when the
data set is large. With appropriately selected q and L, also the second condition is
satisfied [21]. Empirically, in this case it is shown that c2 < 128, to differ from the
method by Wang et al. [21, 31].
Along with the new upper bound (similarly to the previous method (5.2)), in
order to have the injected friction noise to dominate the other error sources, which in
this case is the injected N (0, ηt/N)[21], we set
2(C − B˜)
ηt
 ηt
N
Id ⇔ 2(C − B˜)
η2t
 1
N
Id for all ηt ∈ η, (5.3)
where Id is the identity matrix of size d× d.
In practice this holds true with any moderate sized data set and mainly restricts
the maximum i.e., the first couple step-sizes η0, η1, . . . . Considering that the lack of
corrective MH acceptance step present in SGHMC, high step sizes predispose the model
to biases. Thus this affects the model mostly when the distance between target set
and the starting point is known to be large: the long leap frog trajectories converge
to the target set with less iterations. The parameters c1 and c2 and thus the privacy
parameters  and δ can then be computed numerically with the Moments accountant
algorithm by Abadi et al. [1] ∗.
The moments accountant method achieves the same privacy requirements than
the original method by Wang et al. with higher bound for the step size sequence ηt, or
reciprocally generates tighter bounds for  and δ with the same step size.
∗Code available at https://github.com/ageron/tensorflow-models/tree/master/differential_privacy
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5.3 Tightly Computed Privacy Profile
Similarly to moments accountant method, due to custom noise model, it is enough to
set the injected C large enough to dominate the other error sources. As the step sizes
decrease (ηt → 0), the injected noise is scaled accordingly. The prerequisite for the
error models C and B˜ is the same as above (5.3). Koskela et al. have provided code∗
for calculating the privacy profile via the PLD method [19].
5.4 Computing the Privacy Bounds
Both Moments accountant and privacy loss distribution method are partially invariant
to the actual sampling algorithm. Initially the privacy mechanisms introduced here
are based on stochastic gradient descent algorithm, which is close relation to sampling
algorithms introduced in the thesis [12, 31]. Thus all, both Abadi’s method and the
improved, analytical moments accountant by Wang et al. [30] and the PLD method by
Koskela et al. [19], calculate the privacy parameters (, δ) similarly: by the sampling
probability q = m/N and the standard deviation σ in the privacy mechanism (4.3)
A(X) = ∑
i∈B
∇˜f(xi) +N (0, σ2).
The totalling parameters  and δ for an algorithm are determined by times the input
data is accessed, which in this case is determined by the leapfrog trajectory lengths
and the amount of total iterations: T · J . The mechanism A is composited with itself
as many times in both moments accountant and privacy loss distribution methods.
For moments accountant and PLD, it stands that σ ∼ O
(
1√
η
)
[1, 19], and the
mechanism is at most an unit vector: ||∇˜f(xi)||2 ≤ 1. To achieve this form, we scale
the algorithm with the sequence of step sizes ηt, and the standard deviation σ is scaled
accordingly. Thus the scaled the mechanism yields
A′(X) = ηt
∑
i∈B
∇˜f(xi) +N
(
0, 2(C − B˜)
)√
ηt.
As we clip the gradients (5.1) in the SGHMC algorithm, and as such scale the mech-
anism by the constant L. We have ||∇˜f(xi)||2 ≤ L and the mechanism is scaled
accordingly:
A′(X) = ηtL
(∑
i∈B
∇˜f(xi) +N (0, σ2)
)
,
where
σ2 = 2(C − B˜)
ηtL2
∗Code available at https://github.com/DPBayes/PLD-Accountant/
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and further
σ =
√√√√2(C − B˜)
ηtL2
.
This σ will be used to determine the privacy parameters  and δ.
Previously, in Sec. 3.1, we established that differentially private algorithms
are robust against post-processing. Thus, as scaling the mechanism equate to post-
processing, we are able to scale algorithm with the clipping constant without losing
the privacy.

6. Experiments
We test the introduced HMC implementations in three different ways: first, we demon-
strate the biases in the phase space (q, p) introduced by the sub-sampling of the data,
and then we will evaluate the performance of the methods in sampling a normal dis-
tribution, and in a multi-class classification task using softmax regression. Finally, we
compute the achieved differential privacy in the classification task for the stochastic
gradient HMC and compare the achieved privacy bounds between moments accountant
and tight bound from the PLD method.
6.1 Conservation of the Phase Space Volume
We repeat Betancourt’s experiment [7] and generate N = 500 data-points from one-
dimensional Gaussian distribution N (1, 22) in order to approximate its mean as a
posterior distribution with the prior pi(µ) = N (µ|m, s2), where m = 0 and s = 1. The
log-likelihood for the data set is thus
pi(y|µ) =
N∑
n=1
N (yn|µ, σ2)
with µ = 1 and σ = 2. For each batch Bj, j ∈ J (see Sec. (3.1)) the potential energy
Uj can then be calculated as
Uj = pi(yj|µ) + pi(µ) = σ
2 +Ns2
σ2s2
µ−
(
1
B
∑jB
n=(j−1)B+1 xn
)
Ns2 +mσ2
σ2 +Ns2
2 ,
where yj is the vector of data points belonging to jth batch. Thus, we have the gradient
of the potential energy
∇Uj = −2
(
σ2 +Ns2
σ2s2
)µ−
(
1
B
∑jB
n=(j−1)B+1 xn
)
Ns2 +mσ2
σ2Ns2
 .
Bias Inside One Trajectory
We map the phase space (q, p) after a single leapfrog trajectory of length L = 500 from
the whole data set and sub-sampled sets iterations with step-size η = 0.05. When a
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trajectory inside the Hamiltonian vector field is calculated from a single sample, with
the batch-size B = 10, the difference between the phase spaces of sub-sampled and
full data is evident, and the energy retained by the sub-sample is dependent on the
data-points assigned to that batch – The results will differ considerably depending on
how closely the sub-sampled gradient resembles that of the full data. Larger batch
sizes diminish the difference, but cannot mimic the full data set in full. The Figures
(6.1) were chosen to present the typical scenario. Larger (Fig. (6.2)) or smaller step
size does not change the outcome drastically.
Figure 6.1: Phase space (q, p) evaluated over one integration step with subsampled data. At the
step size η = 0.05 the difference between the actual energy and the sub-sampled volume decreases
with larger batch sizes.
Figure 6.2: Phase space (q, p) evaluated for the full data and Batch size of 10 data points. Here
η = 0.1 for comparison.
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Bias Over Multiple Trajectories
When simulating the Hamiltonian flow with the leapfrog integrator of length L = N/B
for T = 500 iterations, the mini-batched trajectories stray far from the actual phase
space in the Figures (6.3). Again, with larger sub-sample sizes the error decreases
greatly, but will not reach the same accuracy as the whole data set. In this scenario
lowering the step size η gives us considerable gains in phase space accuracy (Fig. (6.4)).
However, with small η we would need more iterations T to traverse the target set, losing
the potential gains in the computational performance.
Figure 6.3: Phase space (q, p) evaluated over the leapfrog integrator with subsampled data. At the
step size η = 0.05 the difference between the actual energy and the sub-sampled volume decreases
with larger batch sizes. Note that the actual phase space i.e., the red circle, stays the same size in
every image.
Figure 6.4: Phase space (q, p) evaluated over the leapfrog integrator with subsampled data. At the
step size η = 0.005 the differences between the actual energy and the sub-sampled volume are not as
radical. Note that the actual phase space i.e., the red circle, stays the same size in every image.
When the friction term with C = 8 ·10−4 is introduced to leapfrog method (Figure
(6.5), it balances the outcome by forcing more trajectories to end up inside the actual
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phase space i.e., having less total energy than the baseline. A singular trajectory will
still stray from the target, but the mean of all trajectories will be closer to baseline.
The amount of friction needed is dependent on the other parameters of the model
– here we fit the friction to accommodate batch size B = 50. At larger batch sizes
the friction starts to have a detrimental effect, as the algorithm starts to put samples
inside the target phase space rather than outside, implying that adjusting the friction
term to the batch size is necessary for good accuracy. At the step size η = 0.05 the
results from the friction term are between the standard leapfrog implementations at
step sizes η = 0.005 and η = 0.05.
However, SGHMC with friction term also fails to accurately reproduce the ex-
act phase space of the standard HMC algorithm. It brings the mean of all energy
states closer to the center of the actual phase space, which can only help reduce the
sub-sampling bias. Thus, we cannot consider it an analytically robust method for elim-
inating the said bias, and Betancourt’s [7] assertion stands. In the next sections we see
how the SGHMC algorithm performs in practice against the standard HMC method.
Figure 6.5: Phase space (q, p) evaluated over the leapfrog integrator with the friction term and
sub-sampled data. At similar step size η = 0.05 the differences between the actual energy and the
sub-sampled volume are smaller at B = 50, but too high friction quickly induces negative bias when
the batch size increases. Similarly a too small friction term cannot control the bias at the lower batch
size. Note that the actual phase space i.e., the red circle, stays the same size in every image.
6.2 Normal Distribution
We use the same distribution and prior to gauge the accuracy of different algorithms
in a simple optimization task by finding the mean of the target distribution. The
gradients are clipped with the constant L = 0.7 and the error model for SGHMC is set
to C = 0.005. For the standard HMC we set the step size η = 0.1 and the amount of
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leapfrog steps J = 15. For the stochastic algorithms we set J = N/B and the sequence
of step size as
ηt = β · t−1/3, t ∈ T,
with the multiplier set β = 1. This is the same implementation as Betancourt’s im-
plementation [7], where each sub-sample is used once in the leapfrog integrator per
iteration. The amount of total iterations is set T = 500. 50% of the drawn samples is
discarded as the burn-in data.
While standard HMC implementation samples the mean with high accuracy, the
naive SGHMC without the friction term biases towards uniform distribution and fails
to find an accurate mean, until the step size multiplier is lowered to 0.002 and the
sampling probability is set to q = 0.10. The SGHMC implementation also has problems
with low sampling ratios, but the results improve with q = 0.10 and we begin to see
consistent accurate estimates. Considering that with q = 0.01 the size of one batch is
only five samples, this is unsurprising.
With no Metropolis-Hastings acceptance step, both stochastic models tend to
wider standard deviations than the basic HMC algorithm. With optimization task this
might be a non-factor, but e.g. confidence intervals from the approximate posterior
might not be accurate. The sampled values, root-mean-square errors and standard
errors are seen in the table (6.1).
Algorithm Mean Sample s Std. error RMSE
Actual 1.0011 - - -
Standard HMC 0.9932 0.0789 0.0038 0.0004
Naive SGHMC 71 707 5079 329 4535
SGHMC w/ q = 0.01 0.4203 32.7348 2.0662 0.0367
Naive HMC w/ q = 0.1, β = 0.002 1.0537 0.0307 0.0019 0.0033
SGHMC w/ q = 0.1 1.0596 2.1496 0.1356 0.0037
Table 6.1: The mean and sample standard deviations s of different HMC algorithms sampling
a normal distribution with a prior pi(θ) ∼ N (0, 1). We measure the accuracy of the estimate with
standard error and the precision with the root mean square error. Naive and SGHMC implementations
are first listed with same sampling parameters and then with parameters yielding accurate results.
6.3 Logistic Regression
The performance of the HMC algorithms is evaluated by multi-class logistic regression
(i.e. softmax regression) against stochastic gradient descent augmented with limited-
memory bfgs optimizer from Python’s Scikit Learn library. The dataset used is Radon
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dataset from the collection by Måns Magnusson [22] and we predict the radon floor
measure value from two log-variables.
Softmax Function and Cross-Entropy Loss
The dataset of size N is classified into K = 5 classes k. We denote the class labels as
matrix Y , which we encode into N ×K sized one-hot matrix. We use two predictive
covariates for each data point, formed into matrix XN×2. Thus our regression model
for the nth data point belonging in the class k, so d = (n, k), is
zd = θ(1,k) + θ(2,k)x(n,2) + θ(3,k)x(n,3).
Here x ∈ X denotes the feature vector of the nth row of the matrixX. To accommodate
the intercept parameter θ1, we concatenate a column of ones, x1, with the matrix X
and can compute the net input matrix Z for the nth row and k:th class:
Zn = θ(1,k)x(n,1) + θ(2,k)x(n,2) + θ(3,k)x(n,3) =
M∑
m=1
θ(m,k)x(n,m)
and for the whole matrix
Z = Xθ.
With M = 2 + 1 features and five classes, the 15-dimensional weight matrix θ will be
M ×K = 3× 5 in size. For each data point, we compute the probabilities for the data
point of belonging to each of the K classes via the softmax function Φ:
P(y = k|Z) = Φ(Z) = e
Z∑K
j=1 e
Zj
.
Thus, the softmax probability matrix Φ(X) will be N ×K in size.
We calculate the cross-entropy loss function to determine the loss for row
F(Z, Yi, θi) = −
K∑
m=1
Yi,m ·
(
log Φ(Z) + log pi(θi,m)
)
,
where log pi(θi,m) denotes the logarithm of the prior knowledge pi. We then minimize
the total loss function L, the mean of losses over all training samples:
L(θ,X, Y ) = 1
N
N∑
i=0
F(Z, Yi, θ),
where N is the number of training samples.
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Classification Results
Each variable of the input data is standardized to mean µ = 0 and standard deviation
s = 1/2, and the training and testing sets are split 80%:20% of the total data. The data
is shuﬄed after every full trajectory and the batches are formed without replacement,
although with this data set the sampling method does not affect the accuracy of the
model.
The following parameters are set for the SGHMC algorithm: the clipping constant
L = 1.0, the scalar-valued error models C = 0.15 and B˜ = 0, sampling probability
q = 0.01, total iterations T = 1500. The sequence of step-sizes for SGHMC is set as
ηt = β · t−1/3, t ∈ T,
with the multiplier set β = 1.7. The amount of integrator steps is set J = N/B, which
mirrors the Betancourt’s implementation of stochastic HMC-algorithm [7] with data
sub-sampling during the trajectory computation.
For standard HMC implementation the hyper-parameters are set as η = 3 and
J = 23 for 60% acceptance ratio. The two tested prior distributions are set to pi1 ∼
N (0, 10) and pi2 ∼ U (−1000, 1000). For the predictions we discard the first 75% of
the samples as burn-in and use the means of the posteriors from the remaining samples
as parameters for logistic regression. The mean accuracy and standard deviation are
calculated from 15 simulations and the results are shown in the table (6.2).
Furthermore, we also test the SGHMC-algorithm with only a fraction of the
available data by setting the trajectory length J = 10, as having J = (N/B) does not
give us any computational gains over the standard HMC [7]. The batch size stays the
same, so we only use 10 batches worth of data. With well optimized hyper-parameters,
this does not affect the accuracy of the model noticeably. We notice that the sampling
probability q = 0.01 is enough for accurate stochastic gradients – having q = 0.05 does
not gain us significantly better results, but compromises the differential privacy of the
model. With the lower J value, the SGHMC algorithm is (9.789, 10−5)-DP with the set
parameters and is on par with the other algorithms w.r.t the classification accuracy.
SGHMC consistently achieves similar classification accuracy as the standard
HMC and SGD algorithms. The naive implementation without the friction term has
a higher sample variance and cannot produce dependable results. The classification
results from the robust algorithms are close enough together for this data set, that the
differences between them could be attributed to random variation. Thus we cannot
consider the results statistically significant, however we note that over multiple execu-
tions SGHMC had consistently a slightly higher accuracy than the differentially private
SGD algorithm while retaining a better privacy profile.
The difference could be explained by Hamiltonian Monte Carlo’s better robustness
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against overfitting, due to random nature of Markov chains. As the dataset is heavily
biased to two of the five possible classes, the better results could possibly be achieved
by more thorough optimization of the regression weight matrix. The choice of the prior
does not affect the results considerably.
Method Accuracy Sample std. dev.
SGD 0.731 0.001
(10.727, 10−5)-DP SGD 0.711 0.004
HMC N target 0.731 0.004
HMC U target 0.732 0.002
(9.789, 10−5)-DP SGHMC, N target 0.730 0.003
(9.789, 10−5)-DP SGHMC, U target 0.726 0.006
Naive SGHMC N , var. η 0.716 0.021
Naive SGHMC U , var. η 0.722 0.013
Naive SGHMC N , const. η 0.616 0.122
Naive SGHMC U , const. η 0.728 0.009
Table 6.2: Means of classification accuracy and the sample standard deviation for different algorithms
after 15 executions. Here N denotes the normal distribution prior and U the uniform distribution
prior.
6.4 Posterior Accuracy of SGHMC
We measure the differentially private 15-dimensional posterior features of the above
softmax regression against a long running standard HMC implementation. As it is
known, that a long running HMC eventually converges to the exact posterior of the
model [8, 24], and when η → 0, the SGHMC also converges to the exact target posterior
[12, 31]. However, then the algorithm’s computational performance will suffer, as
we take only minuscule steps during the integration. Thus, we have to balance the
posterior accuracy and the minimum step size in our model, with the sequence of
ηt = β · t−1/3, t ∈ T , with the multiplier β = 1 and T = 1500, will be η1500 ≈ 0.0874.
We measure the posterior accuracy by calculating the absolute differences between
the HMC and SGHMC posterior standard deviations s for each dimension and denote
their mean as |shmc− ssghmc|, for conciseness. This is not a watertight measure, as the
shape of the posteriors can vary and each execution finds slightly different solutions for
the softmax regression [20]. However, we deem it adequate to showcase the achieved
posterior accuracy.
The naive implementation fails to accurately approximate the exact posterior,
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even with small step sizes, as there is no MH-acceptance step or friction to restrain the
sample deviation from the mean/median. Thus we exclude it from the comparison. We
compare the standard deviations of each dimension of the SGHMC algorithm against
those from standard HMC algorithm run for 5000 iterations (Fig. (6.6)). As each
implementation converges to slightly different solution for the regression parameters θ,
there is little point comparing those values. With the softmax regression the difference
between parameters is not a problem, as due the parameter redundancy there are
multiple values that fit the given data [20].
Our tests show that regardless of parametrisation the classification results from
SGHMC are comparable to those of SGD or HMC methods (Fig. (6.7)): when the
hyper-parameters are approximately in the area which yields the correct results, the
classification accuracy is more often than not on par with the baseline SGD algorithm.
Similarly the difference in the mean posterior accuracy stays low when a large enough
β is used.
Chen et al. recommend keeping the scalar-valued noise model C rather low at
0.01 or less [12]. However we notice that with a large enough step size multiplier the
algorithm yields correct results even with higher amounts of injected noise. The results
stay acceptable until C = 0.66, when at high step size multipliers both accuracy meters
drop catastrophically. However lower multipliers β are still usable.
The SGHMC algorithm converges to a solution in under T = 100 iterations. For
purely optimization tasks, the algorithm is thus able to compete against SGD in speed
and accuracy. The measured posterior accuracy is relatively good, however a good
approximation of the posterior naturally needs a larger sample size.
6.5 Differential Privacy
We compute the moments accountant and the tight privacy profile for the classification
task above. For MA calculation, we use analytical Rényi differential privacy (RDP)
by Wang et. al [30], who has provided the code for calculations∗. The analytical RDP
would give more accurate results than previous implementations of moments accoun-
tant (where applicable). The tight bounds for the privacy parameters are calculated via
PLD-method by Koskela et al. [19], who have also provided the code for calculations†.
∗Code available at https://github.com/yuxiangw/autodp
†Code available at https://github.com/DPBayes/PLD-Accountant/
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Figure 6.6: Five of the total 15 dimensions plotted for HMC and SGHMC. The posterior accuracy is
measured by the average absolute distance from the posterior sampled by the standard HMC algorithm
|sHMC − salgorihm|. Top left: the posteriors of a standard HMC algorithm run for 5000 iterations.
Top right: SGHMC with the error model C = 0.05: |shmc − ssghmc| ≈ 1.68. Bottom left: SGHMC
with the error model C = 0.03: |shmc − ssghmc| ≈ 0.87. With the smaller error, at the expense of
the privacy parameter , we gain improvement in the posterior accuracy. Bottom right: SGHMC
with no regard for differential privacy: the model is optimised to approximate the actual posterior:
|shmc − ssghmc| ≈ 0.65
6.5. Differential Privacy 47
Figure 6.7: Classifcation performance, deviation from the target posterior and (, 10−5)-DP privacy
profile for SGHMC algorithm at different step size multipliers β and error models C after T = 750
iterations with J = 10 integration steps. Here the clipping constant is set to L = 1. The  keeps
improving with the rising error profile, and the results stay the same until C > 0.66, when the injected
noise starts to interfere with both classification and posterior accuracy. The posterior and classification
accuracy are mean results from 10 executions.
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Bounded and Unbounded Differential Privacy
Here we compute the unbounded privacy profile (, δ) [19] i.e., X 'R Y and the mini-
batches are formed by Poisson subsampling [34]. X 'R Y denotes that one data point
has been added or removed from either of the sets. Poisson subsampling means that
each data point is individually and independently collected on the mini-batch via bi-
nomial sampling γ ∼ Binom(q): B = {xi|γ = 1, i ∈ N}. Although to keep consistency
with previous results [1, 12, 30], we likewise approximate the Poisson subsampling by
sampling q · |N | sized mini-batches without replacement.
The unbounded [19] privacy profile is used by both PLD and MA methods of
calculating differential privacy. We can reduce the unbounded profile into bounded
profile: for unbounded (, δ) we have bounded profile (2, (1 + e)δ). When  is small,
the bounded profile can be approximated as (2, 2δ) [19, 30]. The bounded privacy
profile is determined by the relation X 'S Y i.e. |X| = |Y | and the data sets differ by
one modified data point.
PLD Versus Moments Accountant
We obtain the sequence of sigmas
σ =
√√√√2(C − B˜)
ηL2
for computing the privacy bounds (Sec. (5.4)). The following parameters are set for
the SGHMC algorithm: the clipping constant L = 0.7, the scalar-valued error models
C = 1.0 and B˜ = 0, sampling probability q = 0.01, total iterations T = 200. The
sequence of step-sizes for SGHMC is set as
ηt = β · t−1/3, t ∈ T,
with the multiplier set β = 3. Here the integrator steps are set J = 10. Thus the
total amount of iterations to consider w.r.t the privacy bounds is T · J . The results
are shown in Fig. (6.8) and in table (6.3). To keep consistent with the previous results
[1, 34] we set these parameters to have σ ≥ 1.
Overall the PLD method shows a considerable improvement over the privacy
profile, especially with higher δ values. When tested against the amount of iterations,
with constant δ = 10−5, the difference between the methods increases linearly with the
amount of iterations.
Differential Privacy in Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
The problems arise when trying to retain meaningful differential privacy along with
accurate test results. We show that SGHMC is able to obtain both accurate classifi-
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(a)  against variable δ
δ -PLD -MA
10−6 0.881 2.254
10−5 0.763 2.061
10−4 0.629 1.848
0.001 0.473 1.607
0.01 0.273 1.324
(b)  against iteration time with constant δ
# of iterations J · T -PLD -MA
1000 0.609 1.664
2000 0.763 2.061
5000 1.040 2.800
10000 1.324 3.541
Table 6.3: (a) Privacy parameter  computed by given parameter δ for logistic regression after
T · J = 2000 iterations. The PLD profile is considerably smaller than the results from MA. (b)
The effect of total iteration time to the privacy bounds. The values  were computed with constant
δ = 10−5.
Figure 6.8: Left: Calculated parameters  w.r.t. the parameter δ after T ·J = 2000 total iterations.
log(δ) is used for plotting for improved readability. Right: Calculated parameters  and constant
δ = 10−5 w.r.t. number of iterations.
cation results and closely approximated posterior with many different combination of
hyper-parameters (Sec. (6.4)). At recommended amount of injected noise [12] we are
only able to achieve loose privacy bounds, but the model nevertheless stays accurate
until very high values C is used. Thus we can inject high amounts of noise into the
model without compromising the accuracy.
Fig. (6.7) shows the model accuracy and DP-bounds interaction. For comparison,
we run two executions with comparable classification and posterior accuracy to long-
running HMC (Fig. (6.9)). Both run for 1500 iterations with trajectory length J = 10
and sampling probability q = 0.01. The algorithm with set parameters β = 2, C = 0.05
and L = 0.7 is (19.811, 10−5)-DP. With parameters β = 3, C = 0.7 and L = 0.8 the
algorithm is (2.248, 10−5)-DP. They perform similarly, but have vastly different privacy
profiles.
Moments accountant method might not give us reliable privacy bounds in the
typical use-case of SGHMC algorithm: the hyper-parameters that give good results are
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usually set such that σ < 1 for at least at the start of the sequence. For MA method it
is required that σ ≥ 1 [1] and it is implicated that Rényi accountant performs better
with this constraint as well [34, 30]. Additionally, MA converges to better privacy
bounds when the number of iterations is high [1]. While a good approximation of the
posterior demands a large sample size, we see that SGHMC is able to converge to good
optimization solution with a low amount of iterations, and thus MA might not give
good privacy bounds for  and δ in such use cases.
Figure 6.9: Comparison between posterior distributions with similar classification accuracy. Left:
a group of distributions from the posterior of a standard HMC algorithm run for 5000 iterations.
Center: the same distributions from SGHMC with (19.811, 10−5)-DP. |shmc−ssghmc| ≈ 1.67. Right:
SGHMC with (2.248, 10−5)-DP, using high C = 0.7, achieving |σhmc − σsghmc| ≈ 1.57. Even though
the deviation between the posteriors is relatively small, by visual inspection one of the dimensions has
a different shape than it’s actual counterpart.
7. Conclusions
While powerful and versatile tool, Hamiltonian Monte Carlo struggles with huge
datasets due to its reliance on gradient evaluations over the whole data set. Stochastic
gradient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo improves the computational efficiency by using only
fractions of the original dataset to approximate these gradients.
Due to biases caused by integrating over the stochastic gradients, the preservation
of the system’s energy does not hold in theory. However, this bears little significance
in our experiments: a well-adjusted friction term constrains the uncontrolled entropy
increase in the algorithm and the posterior accuracy is preserved in the 15-dimensional
test setting. However, in even higher dimensions the sub-sampling bias might increase
and skew the results, as the friction term cannot conserve the volume of the energy
exactly: it merely stops the samples straying far off from the actual energy state.
The lack of the Metropolis acceptance steps in SGHMC causes the stray samples
to skew the variance in the approximated target set. Typically in optimization tasks
one is only interested in the mode/mean of the approximate posterior. For example,
the confidence intervals from approximate posteriors might not resemble those of the
actual target set. With larger batch sizes, e.g. B = N/2, we get close approximations
of the posterior. The data sizes for the gradient evaluations are cut in half, which
results in improved computational efficiency while still approximately preserving the
energy equilibrium.
We are able to achieve relatively tight differential privacy bounds without sac-
rificing almost any classification accuracy of the SGHMC algorithm. The increased
stochastic noise of the custom error model represented by the additional friction term
could actually help the classification task with difficult data sets by lowering the chance
of overfitting to the training data. As many different parameters affect the privacy
bounds, we optimize the algorithm for better results even inside set privacy restric-
tions.
On the other hand, the multitude of hyper-parameters makes the optimization
of the algorithm also more difficult, and for algorithms such as No-U-Turn-Sampler
(NUTS) [18] it is harder to balance for the efficiency and privacy of the algorithm.
There is no acceptance step implemented in the stochastic algorithms: it would require
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evaluating the probabilities over the whole data set and we would lose the computa-
tional gains. Instead we rely on the decreasing step size to control the deviance from
the target posterior. Thus, nothing restricts the simulated posterior distributions from
deviating from the actual target posterior. Therefore a careful adjusting of the different
parameters is needed for achieving a good approximation of the exact target posterior.
In the experiments we illustrate the effect of choosing appropriate hyper-parameters.
In the thesis we omit the considerations for the privacy cost of the hyper-parameter
itself.
To conclude, we cannot consider SGHMC as a reliable algorithm alone, because
the attributes of the target posterior would have to be known (for example by sampling
it beforehand using the standard HMC algorithm) for adjusting the model to it. We
have confirmed Michael Betancourt’s findings [7] that without using the exact gradi-
ents the posterior accuracy will suffer. Although adding the friction term to SGHMC
algorithm is able to alleviate some amount of the injected bias, it is not a simple fix
and have to be configured precisely to the model’s needs. Thus we should consider
SGHMC merely an imitation of the target posterior and take into consideration the
possible deviation from the actual posterior distribution.
We also notice that the new privacy loss distribution technique to compute the
tight privacy profiles is able to achieve tighter bounds for  and δ than the moments
accountant or the Rényi accountant methods. We are able to optimize the algorithms
to higher precision w.r.t. achieved privacy, as a better privacy bound leads to less
excessive noise injected the model. SGHMC with the added friction term proves diffi-
cult with regards to the differential privacy, as the parameters that allow us effectively
approximate the target posterior also affect the achieved privacy profile.
SGHMC’s strength lies in the optimization tasks: it is shown that SGHMC al-
gorithm converges faster [12] and the results are on par with other, e.g. DP-SGD [21]
algorithms.
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Appendix A. Pseudo Codes
Algorithm 1 Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
Input:
Fixed step-size η and the initial starting point q1.
1: for t = 1 : T do
2: Sample momentum pt ∼ N (0,M)
3: H0 ← (qt, pt)
4: Calculate p0(q0)← η2∇U(q0).
5: for i = 1 : J do
6: qi ← qi−1 + ηM−1pi−1
7: pi ← pi−1 − η2∇U(qi)
8: end for
9: pJ ← pJ − η2∇U(qJ)
10: H ← (qJ , pJ)
11: u ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
12: ρ = eH−H0
13: if u < min(1, ρ) then
14: qt+1 ← qJ
15: end if
16: end for
Output:
Return all collected samples.
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Algorithm 2 Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
Input:
Sequence step-sizes η, ηt ∈ η, the initial starting point q1, Error models C and B˜,
and the clipping norm L. The parameters must satisfy 2(C−B˜)
η2t
 1
N
Id.
1: for t = 1 : T do
2: Sample momentum pt ∼ N (0,M)
3: H0 ← (qt, pt)
4: for i = 1 : J do
5: qi ← qi−1 + ηM−1pi−1
6: ∇U˜(qi)← ∇U˜(qi)/max
(
1, ||∇U˜(qi)||2
L
)
(Clip norm)
7: pi ← pi−1 − ηt
(
∇U˜(qi)− CM−1pi−1 +N (0, 2(C − B˜)
)
8: end for
9: H ← (qJ , pJ)
10: qt+1 ← qJ
No MH acceptance step
11: end for
Output:
Return all collected samples.
